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I. INTRODUCTION
The 1980s were noted for the escalation of the war on drugs. The
dominant public perception was that drug use is a hideous evil that
must be stopped, even at a great cost of public resources and personal
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liberties.1 Parents, politicians, and law enforcement officials rallied to
battle drug use.2 Tremendous expenses and limited victories did not
slow the war on drugs.'
It cannot be disputed that drug abuse is widespread. More than
seventy million Americans have experimented with illegal drugs, and
twenty-three million currently use an illegal drug.4 The costs to society
include drug-related crimes, accidents, lost productivity, increased
health costs, and personal suffering.' Drug users' employers bear a large
portion of the costs resulting from lost productivity, accidents, illnesses,
and related expenses."
1. Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging "Drug Exception" to the Bill of Rights, 38 HASTINGS
L.J. 889, 891 (1987). The war on drugs will cost billions of dollars and already is severely burdening
the courts and prisons. Anderson, Uncle Sam Gets Serious: A Report From the Front Line, A.B.A.
J., Feb. 1990, at 60; Flicker, To Jail or not to Jail, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1990, at 64. These costs reflect
political decisions about allocating resources. The most alarming cost of the war on drugs, however,
is the loss of civil liberties, especially fourth amendment protections, which this Note will address.
2. The war on drugs has even led to random drug tests of public school athletes. See Schaill
ex rel. Kross v. Tippecanoe County School Corp., 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988).
3. Wisotsky, supra note 1, at 891-95. Public support for the war on drugs is far from unani-
mous. Commentators have criticized the effort's expense and effectiveness and its assault on the
Bill of Rights. See, e.g., id. passim; Comment, The Constitutionality of Federal Employee Drug
Testing: National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 38 AM. U.L. REv. 109, 138-40 (1988)
[hereinafter Comment, Constitutionality]; Comment, Do You Abandon All Constitutional Protec-
tions by Accepting Employment with the Government?: Mandatory Drug Testing of Government
Employees Violates the Fourth Amendment, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 169 (1988) [hereinafter
Comment, Do You Abandon?].
Parallels between the war on drugs and Prohibition are obvious, although the war on drugs,
unlike Prohibition, enjoys strong public support. Still, proposals to legalize recreational drugs have
significant support, including that of United States District Court Judge Robert W. Sweet of the
Southern District of New York and economist Milton Friedman. Among those considering the idea
of legalization are former Secretary of State George P. Schultz and K. Brooks Thomas, regional
counsel for the Customs Service in Miami. France, Should We Fight or Switch?, A.BA. J., Feb.
1990, at 43; France, Sweet Sours on War, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1990, 44.
4. M. ROTHSTEIN, MEDICAL SCREENING AND THE EMPLOYEE HEALTH COST CRISIS 95 (1989). De-
spite these staggering figures, it is uncertain whether overall drug use is increasing. One study of
high school seniors from 1979 to 1987 found substantial decreases in the use of marijuana, halluci-
nogens, and cocaine, and a slight decline in alcohol use. Id. at 95-96.
5. Id. at 97. For countless individuals, the results of drug abuse have been tragic. See, e.g.,
Anderson, Tom-Tom's Story, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1990, at 62 (recounting the story of an addict who
began selling illegal drugs at age 12).
6. One estimate is that substance abuse costs United States businesses $99 billion annually
in lost productivity, including absenteeism, with two-thirds of this cost caused by alcohol use. M.
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 4, at 96.
Although businesses lost $81 billion because of accidents in 1984, it is uncertain how much of
this loss was because of substance abuse. Id. Dramatic anecdotal evidence of drug- and alcohol-
related accidents in the transportation industry does exist. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Execu-
tives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1407-08 (1989). Studies of the mining and chemical industries, how-
ever, found that few accidents involved drugs. M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 4, at 98. Still, there is a
widespread perception that substance abuse causes great dangers in the workplace. Employers may
bear other costs because of employees' substance abuse, including increased insurance costs, em-
ployee theft, and respondeat superior liability for employees' actions. Id. at 98-100.
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Some employers have responded by requiring employees to be
tested for drug use.7 The federal government, the Nation's largest em-
ployer, is leading the way in drug testing.8 Serious fourth amendment
issues arise, however, when the government forces employees to submit
to drug testing as a condition of employment. The typical urinalysis of
a government employee constitutes a search without a warrant, proba-
ble cause, or individualized suspicion that a particular employee vio-
lated a law or even a workplace rule. Nevertheless, the United States
Supreme Court in 1989 upheld government drug testing programs in
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab9 and Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives' Association.'0 These cases were among a
flood of recent federal and state court decisions allowing mandatory
testing of federal, state, and municipal employees and private employ-
ees in pervasively regulated industries. These rulings have led several
commentators to note that a "drug exception" to the fourth amend-
ment may be emerging.'1
Part II of this Note details the executive branch's efforts to per-
form drug tests on its employees and on private employees in perva-
sively regulated industries. Part III traces the Supreme Court's recent
erosion of traditional fourth amendment protections against search and
seizure. Part IV describes the Supreme Court's analysis of the executive
branch's efforts at drug testing. Part V examines the analytical struc-
ture that courts use to determine the constitutionality of drug testing
by the government. Part VI traces judicial trends in unsettled legal ar-
eas. Finally, Part VII concludes that the Court's reasonableness balanc-
ing test provides no concrete limit on government searches.
II. THE EXECUTIVE'S WAR ON DRUGS
Against the backdrop of the get-tough attitude sweeping the gov-
ernment,12 President Reagan signed Executive Order No. 12,564, man-
dating drug tests for at least a million civilian federal employees.' 3 This
7. Private sector drug testing may not be as widespread as the public perceives it to be. In a
one-year period spanning 1987-1988 only one percent of private sector workers were tested. Large
companies institute most drug testing programs. A survey by the United States Department of
Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics found that 59.8% of employers with 5000 or more employees
tested workers for drug use, but only 2.7% of firms with less than 100 workers had drug testing
programs. Anderson, Drug Screening, A.B.A. J., June 1989, at 38.
8. Exec. Order No. 12,564, 3 C.F.R. 224, (1987), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1988) [herein-
after Order].
9. 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
10. 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
11. See, e.g., Wisotsky, supra note 1, at 891; Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1426 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
12. For a thorough examination of the scope of the war on drugs, see Wisotsky, supra note 1.
13. Order, supra note 8, § 7(e), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1988); Comment, Do You Aban-
1990] 1345
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Order has proven to be the most controversial aspect of the govern-
ment's multifaceted drug program.14
The Order stipulated that the use of illegal drugs by federal em-
ployees, on- or off-duty, results in lost productivity and poses risks to
public health and safety and to national security. The Order also stated
that drug use is responsible for many crimes, and that drug users are
susceptible to coercion and irresponsible actions. 15 Noting that people
who use illegal drugs are not suitable for federal employment, 6 the Or-
der required all executive agencies to develop drug testing programs for
employees in sensitive positions.17 The Order included about a million
of the 2.8 million federal employees.' Each agency was ordered to test
all job applicants, to create a program to identify sensitive positions,
and to establish criteria on which employees to test.19 The testing pro-
cedures fell into three broad categories: testing based on some degree of
suspicion that an individual employee had used drugs;20 uniform testing
based on triggering events such as applying for certain jobs or being
involved in an accident;2' and testing performed randomly.22 The Order
don?, supra note 3, at 171 & n.18.
14. For a discussion of the privacy and legal concerns expressed about the Order, see Com-
ment, Do You Abandon?, supra note 3, at 170-71 & nn.9-14. The Fifth Circuit in National Trea-
sury Employees Union v. Bush, 891 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1989), held that the Order was facially
constitutional.
Commentators also have questioned the effectiveness of the drug testing plan because it does
not test for abuse of alcohol or legal drugs, or for whether the illegal drug user is actually impaired
by drug use.
15. Order, supra note 8, at 3 C.F.R. 224-25.
16. Id. § 1(c).
17. Id. § 3(a). A position is sensitive when (1) an agency head designates it as such; (2) the
position involves or may involve access to classified material; (3) the position is obtained by Presi-
dential appointment; (4) the position is for a law enforcement officer; or (5) the position involves
law enforcement, national security, the protection of life and property, public health or safety, or
"a high degree of trust and confidence." Id. § 7(d).
18. M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 4, at 101; Comment, Do you Abandon?, supra note 3, at 171-72
n.23.
19. Order, supra note 8, § 3(a), (d). Agencies may test job applicants, employees who volun-
teer to be tested, employees for whom a reasonable suspicion of drug use exists, employees in-
volved in an accident or unsafe practice, and employees undergoing drug counseling. Id. § 3(b)-(d).
20. Drug testing based on individualized suspicion is the least objectionable form of involun-
tary drug testing because the employees' actions caused doubts about ability to do the job. Al-
though the criteria for testing are subjective, employees in drug testing cases prefer individualized
suspicion testing because it is closer to probable cause than the other two categories. See infra
Part V(A).
21. In uniform testing, the employees' actions trigger drug testing; a supervisor generally has
no discretion over whom to test. The most common triggering event is applying for certain jobs.
This category includes many nonemployees seeking jobs as well as employees seeking promotions
or transfers. Other common triggering events are accidents, safety violations, and employees' re-
turns from leave. Because employees sometimes can predict, and perhaps avoid, these situations,
the tests are not as intrusive as random tests. The uniformity of the testing protects employees
from supervisors' potential abuse of discretion. At the same time, the uniformity makes a nonuser
1346
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did not apply to testing within criminal proceedings 3 and agencies are
not required to report violations of federal drug laws to the attorney
general.24 The Order did not, however, explicitly forbid an agency from
releasing test results to law enforcement personnel either voluntarily or
under subpoena.25
Pursuant to the Order, the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices (HHS) created guidelines for agency drug testing programs.26
These Guidelines detail procedures for collecting, transporting, and
testing specimens. The employee urinates in a stall or behind a parti-
tion, unless the tester suspects an adulterated specimen. If adulteration
is suspected, the tester directly observes the employee urinating.27 An
HHS certified laboratory then tests the specimen for illegal drugs. s No
other tests may be performed on the urine unless otherwise authorized
by law. 29 Any sample that tests positive for drug use must be confirmed
by a second test using another procedure.3 0 Employees testing positive
must undergo counseling and refrain from future drug use; otherwise,
they must be fired.31
Some agencies already were testing employees before the Order,
and others were quick to begin testing. By 1988 forty-two federal agen-
cies had begun testing their own employees as well as employees in per-
vasively regulated private industries, such as the merchant marines,
more likely to be tested than the individualized suspicion standard. See infra Part V(B).
22. In random testing, a particular employee's test date is completely unpredictable and is
based on random factors, rather than individualized suspicion or triggering events. Employees and
courts find this test the most objectionable of the three types because it is the most likely to
subject nonusers to testing. The phrase "random testing" sometimes is used to describe uniform
testing, but the two types of testing are distinct. See infra note 225 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of uniform and random testing, see infra Parts V(B) and (C).
23. Order, supra note 8, § 5(h).
24. Id.
25. For a discussion of the fifth amendment implications of government drug testing, see
infra Part VI(B).
26. Mandatory Guidelines for Federal Workplace Drug Testing Programs, 53 Fed. Reg.
11,970 (1988) [hereinafter Guidelines]. The Guidelines affect only testing of executive branch em-
ployees authorized by Executive Order No. 12,564. The Guidelines specifically exclude military
personnel and criminal proceedings. Id. at Subpart A, § 1.1(a), (e).
27. Id. at Subpart B, § 2.2(f)(7), (13); see also Order, supra note 8, § 4(c).
28. Random tests and tests of job applicants must be able to detect marijuana and cocaine
and also may test for opiates, amphetamines, and phencyclidine (also known as PCP or angel
dust). A test predicated by reasonable suspicion, accident, or unsafe practice may target any drug
in Schedule I or II of the Controlled Substances Act, which includes hundreds of drugs. Guide-
lines, supra note 26, at Subpart B, § 2.1(a).
29. Id. at Subpart B, § 2.1(c).
30. Id. at Subpart B, § 2.4(f); see also Order, supra note 8, § 5(e). At this point, an employee
may produce evidence of legal drug use or other factors that might affect the test. Guidelines,
supra note 26, at Subpart B, § 2.7(a)-(c).
31. Order, supra note 8, § 5.
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railroads, airlines, and pipelines.2 Some agencies, such as the Federal
Aviation Administration and the Federal Highway Administration, fo-
cused on testing these private employees.33 The regulations promul-
gated by these agencies addressed safety concerns in such hazardous
transportation industries as airlines, busing, and trucking. Other agen-
cies, such as the Department of Defense, conducted sweeping, random
drug tests of agency employees whose positions implicate national se-
curity, health, or safety, including all employees with access to classified
information. 4 Some agencies reported that an extremely small number
of people tested positive for drug use. 5
III. TRADITIONAL CONCEPTS OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE
A. Drug Testing As a Search
The fourth amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures.3 ' In defining what is unreasonable, the Supreme Court has re-
treated far from its decision in Katz v. United States,7 in which the
Court held that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable. The
Court has retained from Katz, however, the idea that the fourth
amendment protects both people and objects in which a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy.38
32. M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 4, at 102.
33. Sand, Current Developments in Safety and Health, 15 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 125, 133
(1989). In these pervasively regulated industries, the government compels the private employers to
test their employees, thus constituting state action. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n,
109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989). The meaning of "pervasively regulated" is unclear. See infra notes 257-65
and accompanying text.
34. Sand, supra note 33, at 133.
35. At the United States Customs Service, only 6 of the first 5300 people tested had positive
results. Neal, Mandatory Drug Testing: Court Weighs Civil Liberties Objections, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1,
1988, at 58 63. At the Department of Transportation, drug use was found in 61 of the first 8064
people tested. Mohr, Drug Testing Policy Caught in Snags, N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1988, at 17, col.
1. Testing every federal employee, which may have been the Reagan Administration's goal, would
cost $300 million. These figures prompted one commentator to question the need for such testing:
"It is hard to imagine that in the private sector, in the absence of any evidence of a need to test,
such a low yield could justify the expense and intrusiveness of testing." M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note
4, at 118. The government does not measure the success of its testing programs by the number of
drug users detected. Instead, the government maintains that each actual drug user poses such a
great threat that the detection or deterrence of even a few users would justify drug testing. See
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
36. The fourth amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
37. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
38. Id. at 351-52. Katz created a two-part test of reasonableness: (1) whether the person has
1348
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The Supreme Court has held that penetrating a person's skin to
extract blood is a search protected by the fourth amendment." Like-
wise, breath analysis is a search, even though it does not require physi-
cal intrusion into the body.40 The Court also has held that urine testing
constitutes a search under the fourth amendment. 41 The privacy inter-
est in urination may be far more compelling than even the interest im-
plicated by the extraction of blood.42 Nevertheless, most drug testing
programs require the employee to urinate under aural or visual
supervision.
Once the sample of blood, urine, or breath is collected, actual
chemical analysis is a further invasion of the employee's privacy inter-
est." Although the government policy is to test only for illegal drugs,45
analysis of these samples can reveal other medical facts in which the
employee has a legitimate privacy interest.46 Because a drug test in its
entirety is clearly a search that invokes the protections of the fourth
amendment, courts have found it unnecessary to analyze the tests spe-
an actual, subjective expectation of privacy and (2) whether that expectation is objectively reason-
able, i.e., whether society is prepared to respect that expectation. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
39. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768 (1966) (holding that withdrawing and analyz-
ing blood from an unconsenting drunken driving suspect constituted a search); cf. Winston v. Lee,
470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985) (holding that surgically removing a bullet from a wounded robbery sus-
pect would be an unreasonable search).
40. See 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.6(a)
(2d ed. 1987); see also Burnett v. Municipality of Anchorage, 806 F.2d 1447, 1449 (9th Cir. 1986);
Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1142 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 986 (1986).
41. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1413 & n.4.
42. The Fifth Circuit stated:
There are few activities in our society more personal or private than the passing of urine.
Most people describe it by euphemisms if they talk about it at all. It is a function tradition-
ally performed without public observation; indeed, its performance in public is generally pro-
hibited by law as well as social custom.
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 1987), aff'd in part,
109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
43. See Guidelines, supra note 26, at Subpart B, § 2.2.
44. Cf. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987). The Court in Hicks held that police who al-
ready were in a person's apartment legally performed an additional search by moving the person's
stereo to read the serial number. Id. Likewise, a legal justification to obtain a person's bodily fluids
arguably does not automatically justify an analysis of the sample. See Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1425
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
45. This pledge can be broken. The District of Columbia police department secretly used
urine from its drug tests to test female job applicants for pregnancy. Applicants for D.C. Police
Secretly Tested for Pregnancy, Wash. Post, Nov. 5, 1987, at Al, col. 1.
46. See Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1513 (D.N.J. 1986) (noting that em-
ployees have a privacy interest in the information that can be revealed by urinalysis). As part of
some urinalysis programs, the employee may be required to list the medications taken recently in
order to avoid a false reading. This information can reveal private facts. The HHS Guidelines do
not require such disclosure, but the employee may disclose medical information to explain a test
result that indicates drug use.
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cifically as seizures of the bodily fluid 47 or seizures of the person. s
B. The Erosion of the Warrant Requirement
Before performing a search, the government ordinarily must obtain
a warrant from a neutral and detached magistrate. To obtain the war-
rant, the government must demonstrate that it has probable cause to
believe a law has been violated.49 The Supreme Court has greatly re-
laxed this traditional requirement in recent cases. 0 Faced with situa-
tions in which the government's special needs make a warrant
impractical, the Court has created numerous exceptions to the tradi-
tional warrant requirement."'
When a warrant requirement is impractical, the Court has turned
to the reasonableness clause of the fourth amendment. Rather than in-
sist that a magistrate determine before a search that probable cause
exists, the Court instead evaluates the reasonableness of the search af-
ter it has taken place. 52 When the warrant requirement would frustrate
47. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the government's taking of a blood or urine
sample may constitute a "meaningful interference with the employee's possessory interest in his
bodily fluids," but this privacy interest only duplicates the privacy interest present during the
search. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1413 n.4; cf. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 125 (1984)
(destroying a trace amount of cocaine in a field test had only a de minimis impact on any pro-
tected property interest). An argument may be made that a person has no genuine interest in
retaining possession of urine, because he or she normally would dispose of it. Cf. California v.
Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988) (holding that a person retains no privacy interest in garbage
left at the curb for collection). An analogy to Greenwood would be flawed, however, because the
urine in drug testing is never exposed to public view and is seized before the person attempts to
dispose of it.
48. While the government necessarily interferes with the employee's movement in order to
take the sample, it is unclear whether this interference, by itself, is a seizure of the person. Cf.
United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1973) (holding that a grand jury subpoena is not a
seizure of the person, even though it restricts the person's movement). Like the seizure of urine,
the possible seizure of the person does not create an independent fourth amendment issue in drug
testing cases. The restriction of movement, however, is a factor in determining the intrusiveness of
the search. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1413; cf. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707-09 (1983)
(concluding that seizure of traveler's luggage interfered with traveler's freedom of movement).
49. Comment, Do You Abandon?, supra note 3, at 180.
50. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (establishing the traditional require-
ment); see also Comment, Constitutionality, supra note 3, at 110 n.4.
51. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985) (border searches);
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337-43 (1985) (search of student's purse); Illinois v. Lafayette,
462 U.S. 640, 643 (1983) (inventory search of arrested person's possessions); Schneckloth v. Bus-
tamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227-34 (1973) (search with person's consent); Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971) ("plain view" search); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) ("stop and
frisk" search); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537-38 (1967) (administrative search);
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 395 (1914) (search incident to a lawful arrest). See generally
Comment, Constitutionality, supra note 3, at 118 & n.66.
52. Under this disjunctive reading of the fourth amendment, the phrase "no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause" restricts only the warrant process, not all searches. Thus, only
warranted searches require probable cause, and the only constitutional restriction on warrantless
1350
1990] DRUG TESTING 1351
the purpose for the search,5" the Court abandons the warrant require-
ment in favor of a balancing test that weighs the government's interest
in performing the search against the privacy interests of the person be-
ing searched.54
The government most often cites its interest in public safety to jus-
tify testing law enforcement officers,55 firefighters,56 truck drivers, 57 rail-
way workers,5 8 and chemical weapons plant employees. 59 Interests cited
in other cases include providing a drug free environment in public
schools"0 and maintaining the integrity of the horse racing industry.6 1
The interest on the other side of the balancing test is the employee's
privacy.6 2 Employees subject to drug testing by the government, how-
ever, generally hold jobs that diminish their expectations of privacy.
Expectations of privacy can be diminished, for example, when the em-
ployment already requires physical examinations, security investiga-
tions, or other intrusive regulation.6
When using the balancing test, the courts turn to one of three stan-
dards: (1) traditional probable cause without a warrant, (2) reasonable
suspicion, or (3) reasonableness alone. All three are less restrictive than
the warrant requirement. In drug testing cases before 1989, lower fed-
eral courts did not require either a warrant or probable cause.64 Instead,
the courts were divided over which of the two least restrictive standards
to apply. Some courts required that drug tests be based upon a reasona-
searches is that they not be "unreasonable." See 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 40, § 3.1(a); Comment,
Constitutionality, supra note 3, at 118-19 & nn.67 & 73.
53. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967) (citing Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966)).
54. Camara, 387 U.S. 536-37; Comment, Do You Abandon?, supra note 3, at 181.
55. See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989); Na-
tional Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Cheney, 884 F.2d 603 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
864 (1990); Guiney v. Roache, 873 F.2d 1557 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 404 (1989); Brown v.
City of Detroit, 715 F. Supp. 832 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
56. See, e.g., Brown v. Winkle, 715 F. Supp. 195 (N.D. Ohio 1989).
57. See Owner-Operators Indep. Drivers Ass'n of Am. v. Burnley, 705 F. Supp. 481 (N.D.
Cal. 1989); see also American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Skinner, 885 F.2d 884 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(Department of Transportation employees); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Cavazos, 721 F.
Supp. 1361 (D.D.C. 1989) (Department of Education motor vehicle operators).
58. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989); see also Rushton
v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 844 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1988) (nuclear power plant employees).
59. See Thomson v. Marsh, 884 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1989).
60. Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 70 N.Y.2d 57, 510 N.E.2d
325, 517 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1987).
61. Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1986).
62. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
63. For example, employees lessen their reasonable expectations of privacy by working in a
highly regulated private industry, such as horse racing, Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1136, railroads,
Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1402, or the nuclear power industry, Rushton, 844 F.2d at 562.
64. See Comment, National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab: Specimen Surveil-
lance-The Fifth Circuit Approves Urine Testing, 33 LOYOLA L. REv. 1148, 1151 (1988).
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ble suspicion of drug use by the individual or group being tested;"
other courts required only that the testing be reasonable. 6
C. Cases Applying the Individualized Suspicion Standard
In the past few years, the Court has found that numerous situa-
tions merit an exemption from the warrant and probable cause require-
ments. In many of these cases, the Court has employed a balancing test
to hold that the search would have been reasonable and thus constitu-
tional if the government had a reasonable, individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing. 7 In New Jersey v. T.L.O.,6 s for example, the Court held
that a public school official could conduct a warrantless search of a stu-
dent's purse as long as the official had a reasonable suspicion that the
purse contained drugs.6 9 In the same year, the Court held that Customs
agents could detain a suspected alimentary canal smuggler for sixteen
hours based only on a reasonable suspicion that the subject was carry-
ing drugs.70 In 1987 the Court allowed the search of a government em-
ployee's work area based only on individualized suspicion of work-
related misconduct.71
Before 1989 many courts applied the individualized suspicion stan-
dard to government drug testing cases.72 In Capua v. City of Plain-
field 7 3 a district court held that a city could not perform random,
unannounced urine tests on its firefighters.74 Balancing the city's needs
against the intrusiveness of the search, the court held the city to an
65. See infra Part III(C).
66. See infra Part III(D); see also Comment, Constitutionality, supra note 3, at 120. It is
noteworthy that the drug testing cases do not involve a criminal investigation. Comment, Do You
Abandon?, supra note 3, at 184. The employee generally faces only job-related sanctions. But see
Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1415 n.5 (noting that government procedures allowed test results to be
released to- parties in litigation).
67. See infra notes 68-87 and accompanying text.
68. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
69. Id. at 347.
70. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985). In Montoya Customs offi-
cials suspected that an airline passenger had swallowed balloons filled with drugs before entering
the United States. Officials strip-searched her and detained her for 16 hours, waiting in vain for
her to defecate, before seeking a warrant. Id. at 533-35.
71. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (holding that the state's interest in investigating
its employees outweighed an employee's privacy interest in his office); see also Griffin v. Wisconsin,
483 U.S. 868 (1987) (allowing warrantless searches of probationer's homes upon individualized
suspicion).
72. This suspicion could be created by an employee's poor job performance; physical or
mental impairment; an informant's report that particular city employees smoked marijuana on the
job, Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985); or an accident, Division 241
Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976).
73. 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986).
74. Id. at 1522.
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individualized suspicion standard. 5 The court in Feliciano v. City of
Cleveland 8 used the same standard, prohibiting unannounced urine
testing of police academy cadets. Suspicion that the cadet class as a
whole included drug users was insufficient to justify the search, and the
blanket search was not rendered constitutionally reasonable by an in-
formant's tip that the cadet class included some unidentified drug
users.
The Ninth Circuit similarly struck down government-ordered drug
tests of private railroad employees because the tests were not predi-
cated on individualized suspicion in Railway Labor Executives' Associ-
ation v. Burnley.78 Burnley, later reversed by the Supreme Court's
Skinner decision,79 concerned a government requirement that railroads
perform drug tests on employees after certain accidents or rule viola-
tions.8 0 The court found that the government's interest in railroad
safety did not outweigh the employees' privacy interests in avoiding
testing."' Furthermore, the court found that the scope of the tests were
not reasonably related to the drug problem because the tests detected
only recent drug use, not actual on-the-job impairment.8 2
Courts allowed some testing programs that met the individualized
suspicion standard. In Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v.
Suscy,83 the first drug testing case involving nonmilitary public employ-
ees,84 the court allowed urine or blood testing of individual bus drivers
suspected of drug use."' Likewise, the court in Turner v. Fraternal Or-
der of Police86 allowed urine testing of police officers suspected of using
drugs.8
75. Id. at 1517.
76. 661 F. Supp. 578 (N.D. Ohio 1987).
77. Id. at 580; see also City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985) (prohibiting drug testing in a police department absent reasonable suspicion of drug use in
the department); Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 70 N.Y.2d 57, 510
N.E.2d 325, 517 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1987) (prohibiting school district from testing all probationary
teachers).
78. 839 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd sub nom. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n,
109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
79. 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989); see infra notes 129-61 and accompanying text.
80. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 577-78.
81. Id. at 586, 588.
82. Id. at 588-89. The court followed Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968), which defined a
two-pronged test for reasonableness in individualized suspicion searches: a search must be justified
at its inception and must be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that prompted the
search.
83. 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976).
84. Comment, Constitutionality, supra note 3, at 121.
85. Suscy, 538 F.2d at 1267.
86. 500 A.2d 1005 (D.C. 1985).
87. Id. at 1009.
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D. Cases Applying the Reasonableness Standard in Administrative
Searches
The government may conduct warrantless searches without any in-
dividualized suspicion in several situations, including searches of people
crossing the United States border, 8 boarding airplanes,8" and entering
federal courthouses.9 0 In these situations, courts apply a pure reasona-
bleness standard, the lowest standard for a warrantless search. This cat-
egory is sometimes called administrative searches because the search is
part of a general administrative plan rather than an effort to gather
evidence in a specific criminal investigation.91 Because no crime is sus-
pected in an administrative search, the government could not demon-
strate probable cause to obtain a warrant. Therefore, the government
simply must show that the search was part of an administrative plan
that is both reasonable and based on neutral criteria.92
The seminal case on administrative searches is Camara v. Munici-
pal Court,93 which approved warrantless safety inspections of residen-
tial buildings. 4 The Court did not require a warrant, probable cause, or
any individualized suspicion for these searches, which were designed
not to investigate suspected violations but to deter violations through
the threat of unannounced inspections. 5 The Court balanced the gov-
ernment's strong interest in public safety against the individual's pri-
vacy interest in the home and concluded that the nature of the search
did not greatly invade the individual's privacy.6
The District of Columbia Circuit cited Camara in Committee for
88. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985); United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
89. United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1973); United States. v. Morena, 475
F.2d 44 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 840 (1973).
90. Dbwning v. Kunzig, 454 F.2d 1230 (6th Cir. 1972). See generally Comment, Do You
Abandon?, supra note 3, at 185.
91. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535-37 (1967). One district court disputed the
significance of an administrative search's noncriminal purpose, because investigations of govern-
ment employees "always carry the potential to become criminal investigations." Allen v. City of
Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 491 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
92. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320-22 (1978) (holding that an administrative
search of a business for a safety violation by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
required a warrant and reasonable legislative and administrative standards but not probable
cause).
93. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
94. Id. at 546. The Court, however, prevented the defendant's prosecution for refusing to
permit the inspection. The Court ruled that the city needed to obtain a warrant after the defend-
ant refused to allow peaceful entry. Id. at 534.
95. Id. at 537; see Banzhaf, How to Make Drug Tests Pass Muster, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 12, 1987,
at 13, col. 1.




GI Rights v. Callaway, the first drug testing case.97 The court allowed
the Army to test soldiers' urine without any level of individualized sus-
picion. 8 The court balanced the strong governmental interest in mili-
tary readiness against soldiers' privacy interests in avoiding testing.
Because soldiers routinely are subject to searches and discipline by
superiors, their expectations of privacy are greatly diminished.9 9 Lower
federal courts and state courts did not immediately adopt the Callaway
court's elimination of the individualized suspicion requirement, perhaps
because military employment diminishes employees' privacy interests
much more than other public employment does.
In the late 1980s several circuits began to allow government drug
tests without individualized suspicion.' 00 The Third Circuit, for in-
stance, approved random urinalysis of racehorse jockeys in Shoemaker
v. Handel.1°1 The court found that the New Jersey racing commission
had a legitimate interest in the integrity and safety of the horse racing
industry. In the balancing test this state interest outweighed the jock-
eys' expectations of privacy, which already were diminished by the per-
vasive regulation of the industry. 102 The Eighth Circuit likewise
established an exception to the individualized suspicion requirement for
guards at medium and maximum security prisons in McDonell v.
Hunter.0 3 The court allowed random and uniform urinalysis tests to
promote safety in prisons. 04 Similarly, in Rushton v. Nebraska Public
Power District'"° the Eighth Circuit ruled that individualized suspicion
was not a prerequisite for testing nuclear power plant employees. The
court allowed testing based on a government finding that drugs played
an increasing role in accidents at nuclear plants. 10 6 The Fifth Circuit
followed this trend of allowing suspicionless testing in National Trea-
sury Employees Union v. Von Raab.107 The court allowed the Customs
Service to test certain employees uniformly, with no individualized or
general suspicion that any of the employees used illegal drugs. 0 8
97. 518 F.2d 466, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Most early case law on urinalysis involved the Army
program. Comment, Constitutionality, supra note 3, at 113.
98. 518 F.2d at 474.
99. Id. at 477.
100. See Comment, Constitutionality, supra note 3, at 127.
101. 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1986).
102. Id. at 1141-42.
103. 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987).
104. Id. at 1308. The court held that prison employees in less sensitive positions could not be
tested without individualized suspicion. Id.
105. 844 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1988).
106. Id. at 563, 567.
107. 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989). For a
discussion of Von Raab, see infra notes 175-97 and accompanying text.
108. 816 F.2d at 173.
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Although the Third, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits allowed the govern-
ment to perform random and uniform testing of employees, the Ninth
Circuit insisted on individualized suspicion. 09 This circuit split set the
stage for the 1989 Supreme Court decisions in Skinner v. Railway La-
bor Executives' Association"0 and National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab."'
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S RESPONSE
The Supreme Court resolved the circuit split over the proper stan-
dard for government drug testing by reversing the Ninth Circuit's re-
quirement of individualized suspicion for government-ordered drug
testing of railroad workers. 1 2 On the same day the Court affirmed in
part the Fifth Circuit's ruling that the Customs Service could randomly
test its work force despite a very low incidence of drug use.1 3 Justice
Anthony Kennedy, in his first prominent majority opinions,"" wrote
that the compelling government interests in each case outweighed the
employees' diminished expectations of privacy, making the searches
reasonable even in the absence of individualized suspicion.11 5
A. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association
1. Facts and Procedural History
Employee alcohol and drug abuse traditionally have troubled the
railroads despite industry efforts to combat the problem." 6 Because the
Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) found that alcohol and drugs
contribute to many railroad accidents and fatalities,17 it ordered the
railroads to test employees in certain situations. 18 For example, after
109. See Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 589 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd
sub nom. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
110. 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989), rev'g sub nom. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley, 839
F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1988).
111. 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989), aff'g in part, vacating in part, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987).
112. See Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1402.
113. See Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1384.
114. See Stewart, Slouching Toward Orwell, A.B.A. J., June 1989,.at 44, 46.
115. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1413-21; Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1391-96.
116. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1407. A 1979 study by the FRA estimated that 23% of operating
personnel were "problem drinkers." One in eight railroad workers drank on the job in the previous
year. Id. at 1407 n.1 (citing 48 Fed. Reg. 30,724 (1983)).
117. The FRA blamed railroad employees' alcohol and drug use for 45 train accidents and
incidents, 34 fatalities, 66 injuries, and more than $28 million in property damages (in 1983 dol-
lars) from 1975 through 1983. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1408.
118. Id. The regulations, 49 C.F.R. §§ 219.1-.505, predated Executive Order No. 12,564 and
were promulgated under the FRA's power to regulate "all areas of railroad safety." Skinner, 109 S.
Ct. at 1407 (citing 45 U.S.C. § 431(a) (1988)). After their passage, the HHS Guidelines required the
Department of Transportation to conform its testing program to the HHS requirements. Guide-
1356 [Vol. 43:1343
DRUG TESTING
significant accidents, all covered railroad employees must submit blood
and urine samples to independent medical personnel. 19 Also, the rail-
road has the discretion to order covered employees to submit to breath
and urine tests after certain rule violations. 1 0 Finally, the railroad may
order an employee whom a supervisor reasonably suspects is impaired
to be tested at any time.' 2' The railroad mails the samples to the FRA
for analysis.'22 Samples that indicate drug use must be confirmed by a
second test using different procedures. 2 3 The testing program was in-
tended to aid accident investigations and employee discipline. FRA reg-
ulations, however, allow the agency to release the results to law
enforcement authorities. 24 An employee who refuses to submit to blood
or urine tests may not perform certain duties for nine months.'25
The Railway Labor Executives' Association sued to enjoin the test-
ing. The district court ruled that the governmental interest in railway
safety outweighed the railroad employees' interests in preserving their
bodily integrity.22 The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that such
searches without individualized suspicion violated the fourth amend-
ment.12 7 The Supreme Court again reversed, reasoning that because the
government's interest in railroad safety outweighed the employees' pri-
vacy interests, the searches were reasonable under the fourth
amendment. 28
2. The Supreme Court's Analysis
The Court first held that the government's involvement in the test-
ing program constituted government action.'29 The Court then held
lines, supra note 26, at Subpart A, § 1.1(b).
119. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1408-09. In relatively minor accidents, a railroad representative
has the discretion not to test employees who had no role in the accident. Id. at 1408-09 & n.2.
120. Id. at 1409.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See id. at 1409 n.3. Alcohol tests are confirmed by a second test.
124. Id. at 1415 n.5. The FRA regulations specifically allow test results to be released to "a
party in litigation upon service of appropriate compulsory process. . . ..." The Court did not con-
sider this self-incrimination issue because it was not presented by the facts of this case. Id. at 1415
n.5 (quoting 49 C.F.R. § 219.211(d) (1987)). For a discussion of the fifth amendment, see infra Part
VI(B).
125. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1409. The employee, however, is entitled to a hearing concerning
such refusal. Id.
126. The court granted summary judgment to the defendant Secretary of Transportation. Id.
at 1410.
127. 839 F.2d 575 (1988).
128. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1402.
129. See id. at 1411-12. Although the railroads are privately owned, the FRA requires testing
after major accidents and encourages discretionary testing. Id. at 1408-09. The FRA regulations
allowing discretionary testing preempt state law and supercede collective bargaining and arbitra-
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that the tests constituted searches under the fourth amendment be-
cause they intruded into the employees' bodily integrity, violated per-
sonal dignity, and revealed private medical facts. 130 Although the tests
were searches and thus required warrants and probable cause under the
traditional view, the Court found that railroad safety presented a spe-
cial need that justified an exception to the warrant requirement. 131 The
Court reasoned that the lack of concrete facts on which to base a war-
rant made the requirement problematic. 3 2 Further, a delay caused by a
warrant requirement would allow intoxicating substances to be elimi-
nated from the employees' bodies.133 The Court concluded that the war-
rant requirement would frustrate the governmental purpose in
requiring the search.13 4
After the Court dispensed with the warrant requirement, it held
that these drug tests did not require either probable cause or any
"quantum of individualized suspicion. '1 5 Instead, the Court instituted
a pure reasonableness standard, balancing governmental interests
against the individual's privacy interests.' The government's sole
stated interest in Skinner was the safety of the public and of the rail-
road employees. 3 7 Protecting this important safety interest justified
some degree of governmental intrusion, to be determined by a balanc-
tion agreements. Id. at 1409. Under the regulations, a railroad must discipline an employee who
refuses to submit to tests. Id. at 1411-12.
130. Id. at 1412-13. Because the testing fully invoked fourth amendment protection, the
Court found it unnecessary to determine whether the tests were a seizure of the person or the
person's bodily fluids. Id. at 1413 & n.4. The Court noted, though, that because most jobs restrict
the employee's freedom of movement, restricting an employee's movement for a drug test did not
significantly infringe on these already diminished privacy interests. Id. at 1417.
131. Id. at 1414.
132. According to the Court, there were "virtually no facts for a neutral magistrate to evalu-
ate." Id. at 1416. Some situations give a railroad supervisor discretion on whether to order a
search, based on the supervisor's determination of whether an employee contributed to the acci-
dent. The Court noted that the supervisor's discretion was limited by FRA regulations. Still, the
decision to use the force of law to require a citizen to submit to a bodily search is normally made
by a detached magistrate, not a private employer, and is based on constitutional requirements, not
agency regulations. The Court addressed this concern, ruling that it would be "unreasonable to
require railroad supervisors unfamiliar with the law to follow warrant procedures." Id. at 1416 &
n.5. Fear of officials' unbridled discretion to search, however, is the reason for the warrant require-
ment. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). A similar fear certainly exists in this
situation.
133. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1416.
134. Id. at 1416 (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 533).
135. Id. at 1417 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976)).
136. Id. The Court stated: "[A] showing of individualized suspicion is not a constitutional
floor, below which a search must be presumed unreasonable." When an important government
interest outweighs minimal privacy interests, a search may be reasonable without individualized
suspicion. Id.





Using the reasonableness standard, the Court allowed the
mandatory blood testing, comparing it to the mandatory blood testing
of a suspected drunken driver. 9 The Court declared that the blood test
was a limited intrusion into the employee's privacy, involving very little
risk, trauma, pain, or undue invasion of the employee's bodily integ-
rity. 0 The Court also allowed breath testing, because it requires less
bodily intrusion than a blood test and reveals only whether the person
has used alcohol.14 '
The Court was more troubled by the urine tests because of the
unique privacy interest in excretory functions. The Court noted, how-
ever, that FRA collection procedures reduced the urine test's intrusive-
ness, and it dismissed concerns about other procedures that employees
might find intrusive.1 42 Furthermore, it found that railroad employees'
expectations of privacy were diminished by their employment in a per-
vasively regulated industry that often requires physical examinations of
its employees. 43
The Court balanced this limited privacy interest in urination
against the government's interest in testing without individualized sus-
picion and found that the government's interest was compelling. 44 The
Court reasoned that railroad employees' substance abuse has resulted
in significant safety threats. 45 Furthermore, the industry's attempts to
detect and deter employees' substance abuse had failed, because em-
ployees' performances could be impaired without noticeable signs.14
The Court agreed with the FRA that the test results give railroads valu-
able information that might otherwise be lost in the "chaotic after-
math" of a train accident. 47 The Court also found that the testing
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1417 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966), which held that
extracting blood from a suspected drunken driver without a warrant is not a significant or danger-
ous intrusion).
140. Id. at 1417 (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771).
141. Id. at 1417-18.
142. Id. at 1418. The Court stressed that urine samples were taken in a medical environment.
The Court scarcely noted, however, that the FRA Field Manual clearly recommended visual obser-
vation of the employee's urination. Id.; see also id. at 1428 & n.8 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Fur-
thermore, the Court did not find it a significant invasion of privacy that employees giving blood or
urine samples must disclose all medications taken within 30 days. Id. at 1418 n.7.
14:3. Id. at 1418 & n.8. Physical examinations, particularly eyesight examinations, historically
have been justified by the great danger involved in operating a train. Id. at 1418-19 & n.8.
144. Id. at 1419.
145. Id. at 1407-08, 1419.
146. Id. at 1419. The Court did not require the government to use the least intrusive means
to accomplish its goals, as this limit would seriously hinder the government's search and seizure
powers. The FRA did consider and reject less intrusive alternatives to drug testing. Id. at 1419 n.9.
147. Id. at 1420. According to Justice Anthony Kennedy, this information is valuable even if
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techniques were reasonably accurate.148 The Court concluded that drug
tests were sufficiently effective in furthering the FRA's twin goals of
detecting and deterring impairment so that testing without individual-
ized suspicion was constitutional.
149
Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in part, pointedly disagreeing
that an alcohol or drug user would be deterred by the threat of being
fired more than by the risk of causing a catastrophic train wreck.1 50 In a
scathing dissent, Justice Thurgood Marshall 5' wrote that the zeal to
battle drug abuse led the majority to erode the foundation of the fourth
amendment. 2 He criticized the majority for discarding the constitu-
tional requirements of warrant and probable cause as impracticable and
for replacing them with a malleable special needs balancing analysis of
whether the search was reasonable.5 3 Justice Marshall pointed out that
the Skinner decision reinforced two serious incursions into fourth
amendment protection: first, the balancing test was applied to the
search of a person, not merely possessions; and second, the special
needs analysis was applied with no requirement of individualized
suspicion. 54
Justice Marshall would replace the majority's balancing test with a
traditional search analysis, requiring a warrant or an exception to the
warrant requirement, probable cause, and reasonableness.'55 Acknowl-
edging the exigency of a train wreck, Justice Marshall would not require
a warrant to take blood or urine samples. He would, however, require a
warrant supported by probable cause before a sample is tested. 56 To
satisfy the probable cause requirement, Justice Marshall would require
some degree of individualized suspicion for even a minimally intrusive
it does not determine whether the employee was-impaired at the time of the accident. Id. at 1420-
21. A major criticism of drug testing is that it determines only whether the employee has used
drugs in recent weeks, not whether the employee was impaired at work. M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note
4, at 106-07. The Court answered that evidence that an employee recently used drugs or alcohol
can be relevant, but not conclusive, in determining whether the employee was impaired at the time
of an accident. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1421. The tests, therefore, are useful even if uncertain.
148. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1421 n.10.
149. Id. at 1421 & n.10.
150. Id. at 1422 (Stevens, J., concurring).
151. Justice William Brennan joined Justice Thurgood Marshall's dissent.
152. See Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1423 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall compared
the loss of liberties in the war on drugs to Japanese-Americans' loss of liberty during World War
II. Id. at 1422. He wrote that the majority underrated the privacy interests inherent in the collec-
tion of the samples, the unrelated but still private information that can be gleaned from blood or
urine samples, and the medication questionnaire. Id. at 1428-29.
153. Id. at 1423.
154. Id. at 1425.
155. Id. at 1426.
156. Id. Justice Marshall viewed the collection and the analysis of bodily fluids as separate
searches.
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search, and he considered blood and urine testing to be extremely
intrusive.157
Even if Justice Marshall accepted the majority's balancing test, he
would find that the drug tests' extreme intrusiveness greatly out-
weighed the government's interest in deterring and detecting substance
abuse.158 The FRA's willingness to give the test results to criminal pros-
ecutors would weigh heavily against the government in this balancing
test.15 Justice Marshall acknowledged the value of fighting drug abuse,
but criticized the government's draconian methods. 60 He attacked the
majority's method by extending it to its logical but disturbing conclu-
sion: countless criminals could be caught if fourth amendment protec-
tions were eliminated altogether.' 6'
B. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab
1. Facts and Procedural History
The United States Customs Service is responsible for preventing
illegal drugs from entering the country.162 Some employees face physical
injury, death, bribery, and the temptation of confiscated contraband.'6 3
Investigations of Service employees' wrongdoings result in the arrests of
157. Id. at 1427. Justice Marshall compared the collection of blood with actions that the
Court has described as "severe" intrusions, such as the search of a suspect's outer clothes, Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1968), and the search of scrapings from a suspect's fingernails, Cupp v.
Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973). In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966), the
Court required individualized suspicion before testing the blood of a single drunken driving sus-
pect. In Skinner, the Court allowed mass blood testing without individualized suspicion. Skinner,
109 S. Ct. at 1427-28 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Justice Marshall was incredulous that the majority viewed the collection of urine as a "mini-
mal" intrusion upon the employees' privacy. He found the majority's dismissal of the FRA Field
Manual's instructions to urine collectors to observe the employees' urination visually especially
distressing. This portion of the majority's analysis demonstrates "the shameless manipulability of
its balancing approach." Id. at 1428-29 & n.8.
Finally, Justice Marshall found that the FRA's analysis of the fluid samples was a severe in-
trusion. The fluid can be analyzed to disclose medical information unrelated to drug use in which
the employee has a privacy interest, such as epilepsy, diabetes, and depression. The employees'
privacy is further invaded by the FRA requirement that they list medications used. Id. at 1429.
This intrusiveness is not lessened by any diminished expectations of privacy occasioned by exami-
nations of employees' physical fitness or searches of their possessions. Id. at 1429-30.
158. Id. at 1430.
159. Id. at 1431 & n.10. Also weighing against the government is the overinclusiveness of the
tests: the tests measure only whether drug use has occurred within 60 days of the test, rather than
measuring current impairment. Id. at 1431-32. Justice Marshall echoed Justice John Paul Ste-
vens's concern that a drug user undeterred by the threat of a train wreck would not be deterred by
the threat of being fired. Id. at 1432.
160. Id. at 1433.
161. Id. at 1430.
162. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1387 (1989).
163. Id. at 1392.
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significant numbers of employees and civilians.' Very few Service em-
ployees, however, used illegal drugs."6 5 Nevertheless, the Service imple-
mented a drug testing program for applicants for certain jobs.' 66 The
program requires uniform urine testing of all Service employees tenta-
tively accepted for transfer to jobs in three categories: (1) positions re-
quiring direct involvement in drug enforcement, 6 7  (2) positions
requiring employees to carry a firearm,'6 8 or (3) positions requiring em-
ployees to handle classified material.'69 The program requires testers to
monitor applicants' urination aurally but not visually. The samples are
sent to a laboratory, where all positive samples are retested. 170 Employ-
ees testing positive for illegal drug use are fired, but the test results
may not be released to any other agency or law enforcement authorities
without the employee's permission.1
The National Treasury Employees Union and a union official
sought to enjoin the testing, alleging that it violated the fourth amend-
ment. The district court granted the injunction, ruling that such
searches without individualized suspicion were unreasonable. 1 2 The
Fifth Circuit vacated the decision, holding that the search was reasona-
164. Id. at 1392-93. Hundreds of such investigations each year resulted in the arrest of 24
employees and 54 civilians in 1987, 37 employees and 17 civilians in 1986, and 15 employees and 51
civilians in 1985. Id. No evidence, however, linked any of these investigations to drug use by Ser-
vice employees. Id. at 1400 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 1387. The Service Commissioner acknowledged that the Service was "largely
drug-free" when the testing began.
166. Id. at 1388. The program began in May 1986, several months before President Reagan's
Executive Order and two years before the HHS Guidelines. Because the Service subsequently was
required to conform its program with the HHS Guidelines, Guidelines, supra note 26, at Subpart
A, § 1.1(b), to the extent that the Guidelines supplemented or displaced the Service's program, the
Court considered the Service's program as though it followed HHS procedures. Von Raab, 109 S.
Ct. at 1388 n.1.
The Service's original program required the applicant to disclose at the time of the test all
medications taken within the past 30 days. This requirement was similar to the Skinner test but
contrary to the HHS Guidelines. Under the HHS Guidelines, the applicant is not required to re-
veal medical information but may do so to dispute a positive test. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1388
n.1. Unlike the test in Skinner, the Service's test had no provision for alcohol testing.
167. Id. at 1388. The Service reasoned that a drug user in such a position could steal drugs
and otherwise hinder the drug interdiction program. Id. at 1392-93.
168. Id. at 1388. The Service cited the dangers to agents and the public if an impaired person
were employed in these first two categories. Id. at 1393.
169. Id. at 1388. The Service stated that illegal drug users in these positions would be sus-
ceptible to bribery or blackmail. Id. Positions that handled "classified material" included account-
ants, accounting technicians, animal caretakers, attorneys, baggage clerks, co-op students, electric
equipment repairers, mail clerks and assistants, and messengers. Id. at 1397.
170. Id. at 1389.
171. Id. This provision differs from the testing procedure upheld in Skinner under which the
agency may release the test results. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
172. 649 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. La. 1986).
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ble because of its limited scope.173 The Supreme Court affirmed in part,
remanding to determine whether the testing of employees who handle
classified material was reasonable. 174
2. The Supreme Court's Analysis
The Court reiterated its holding in Skinner17 5 that urinalysis is a
search designed to deter drug use and to prevent the promotion of drug
users. 176 Without discussion, the Court declared that these goals consti-
tute a special need that is excepted from the warrant and probable
cause requirements.17 7 The Court noted that obtaining warrants would
not be difficult for Service employees, who are familiar with the warrant
process, but stated that requiring them to seek warrants would only
waste Service resources. Furthermore, warrants would add no protec-
tion to the testing program, because the program guidelines leave the
Service no discretion and would provide a magistrate with no special
facts to evaluate.17 8
In rejecting the individualized suspicion standard, the Court analo-
gized urinalysis to building inspections and routine border stops, in
which the government seeks to prevent, rather than detect, violations
and is allowed to search without articulable grounds. 79 For employees
involved in drug interdiction, the Court stressed their frequent expo-
sure to criminals and the resultant potential for corruption. 80 For em-
ployees carrying firearms, the potential danger to others is apparent.' 8'
The Court concluded that the governmental interest in preventing drug
use by these employees outweighed the job applicants' privacy interests,
which were diminished by their seeking these particular jobs. Employ-
ees applying for such positions should expect the government to investi-
gate their judgment and physical fitness.8s Furthermore, the Court
stressed that the testing program's objective criteria prevented abuse of
the process. 83
173. 816 F.2d 170, 179 (5th Cir. 1987).
174. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1397-98.
175. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
176. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1390. Unlike the situation in Skinner, the Service did not aim
to detect drug use, because no significant problem with drug use existed. Also unlike Skinner, the
goal was not to deter or detect alcohol impairment.
177. Id. at 1390-91.
178. Id. at 1391. Unlike the railroads in Skinner, the employer in Von Raab has no discretion
over which employees are tested. The Customs Service must test all employees who apply for
certain jobs.
179. Id. at 1391-92.
180. See id. at 1392-93.
181. Id. at 1393.
182. Id. at 1394.
183. Id. at 1394 n.2. The Court stated that the intrusiveness of the urinalysis is minimized by
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The Court rejected two contentions by the challengers. First, the
Court denied that the searches were unreasonable because of the ex-
tremely low incidence of drug use among Customs Service employees.""'
The Court stated that the severity of the danger posed by a drug-using
Service employee would compensate for the low incidence of drug use
detected. 8 5 Second, the Court denied that the testing was ineffective
and, thus, unreasonable because a drug user could deceive the test by
altering the specimen or by abstaining from drug use before the test. 8 "
Although it found the testing of applicants in the first two job cate-
gories to be reasonable, the Court was unable to determine the reasona-
bleness of testing applicants for jobs that require handling classified
material.18 7 The Court agreed that employees who handle sensitive ma-
terial may be required to undergo drug testing, especially if their pri-
vacy interests already have been diminished by background
investigations or medical examinations. 88 The Court remanded the is-
sue, however, to determine whether the Service's definition of such em-
ployees was overbroad." 9
Justice Thurgood Marshall dissented, referring readers to his dis-
sent in Skinner. 90 A surprise dissent came from Justice Antonin Scalia,
who had joined the majority in Skinner.'9' He distinguished Skinner
because it involved proven drug and alcohol use by the targeted em-
ployees resulting in proven harm." 2 Justice Scalia wrote that the Ser-
vice's program in Von Raab was nothing more than a symbol of
opposition to drug use'93 because the Customs Services had no real drug
the Service's procedures: the Service has no discretion as to who is tested, applicants are notified
of the test in advance, urination usually is not directly observed, samples may be tested only for
drug use, and employees need not disclose personal medical information.
184. Id. at 1394.
185. Id. at 1395. The Court compared the danger of an occasional drug-using employee being
bribed or blackmailed to the danger posed by a single hijacker, which is great enough to justify
searches of all public airline passengers. Id. at 1395 & n.3.
186. Id. at 1395, 1396. The Court stated that the HHS procedures adequately prevent altera-
tion of the specimen. Also, the Court noted that addicts may be unable to abstain or may be
unaware that drugs remain in their systems for up to 22 days. Id. at 1396.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1397.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1398 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice William Brennan joined Justice Thurgood
Marshall's dissent, as he did in Skinner.
191. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice John Paul Stevens, who concurred in part in Skinner,
joined Justice Antonin Scalia's Von Raab dissent.
192. Id. at 1398.
193. Id. The Service Commissioner said that the drug testing program would "set an impor-
tant example" in the war on drugs. Id. at 1401. Justice Scalia agreed that the war on drugs was a




problem."9 ' Justice Scalia also questioned the deterrent effect of drug
testing."" Justice Scalia feared that the breadth of the majority's deci-
sion would lead to drug testing of a tremendous range of people. 196 For
example, a large number of public employees outside the Customs Ser-
vice carry firearms. The justifications for testing Service employees in
this category could apply to anyone whose job performance might en-
danger others, such as automobile drivers, heavy equipment operators,
construction workers, and school crossing guards. Similarly, the major-
ity's approval, in principle, of testing employees with access to sensitive
material could lead to testing of broad categories of federal
employees. 197
V. ANALYTICAL STRUCTURE FOR DRUG TESTING CASES AFTER SKINNER
AND VoN RAAB
The Supreme Court has made it clear that government drug testing
is constitutional as long as it meets a reasonableness balancing test.
Federal government programs generally follow Executive Order No.
12,564, including individualized suspicion, uniform, and random tests in
each program.198 Some decisions make little or no distinction among the
categories. 9 Others incorporate the distinctions as factors in the bal-
ancing tests.20 0 Because of the ad hoc nature of the balancing test,
courts after Skinner and Von Raab have established no clear standards
for drug testing.
A. The Individualized Suspicion Standard
The Supreme Court dealt a severe blow to the individualized suspi-
cion requirement for the government's uniform drug testing of employ-
194. Id. at 1399. Justice Scalia said that it was mere speculation that a drug user would be
more susceptible to bribery by a drug smuggler than a diamond wearer would be susceptible to
bribery by a diamond smuggler. Id.
195. Id. The majority did not cite "even a single instance in which any of the.speculated
horribles actually occurred. . . ." Id. at 1400 (emphasis in original). Justice Scalia thought that a
gun-carrying agent whose drug use was not deterred by the risk of dying in a gun battle would not
be deterred by the threat of losing his job. Id. at 1399. This argument parallels Justice Stevens's
concurring opinion in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1422 (1989); see
supra text accompanying note 150.
196. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1400-01 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 1401. Soon after the Von Raab decision, Justice Scalia said of the drug crisis: "I
feel we have gone off the deep end a little to meet that crisis." Stewart, supra note 114, at 46.
198. See, e.g., American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Skinner, 885 F.2d 884 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(Department of Transportation); Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. de-
nied, 110 S. Ct. 865 (1990) (Department of Justice).
199. See infra notes 224-25 and accompanying text.
200. See infra notes 207-13, 224 & 226.
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ees.20 1 Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a group in which fewer people
invoke individualized suspicion than the Customs Service employees in
Von Raab.2" 2 The decisions in Von Raab and Skinner prompted one
scholar to ask: "[W]hat happened to the Fourth Amendment? '20 3 What
happened was that the Court further separated the fourth amendment's
reasonableness clause from the warrant and probable cause clause, and
for the first time applied the reasonableness balancing test with no war-
rant requirement to searches of the person, rather than searches of pos-
sessions.20 4 After Skinner and Von Raab it should be easy for the
government to harness the momentum of the war on drugs to tip the
balance in favor of drug testing.20 5 Individualized suspicion testing is
more likely than uniform or random testing to be upheld in court. In
fact, plaintiffs sometimes do not even challenge the individualized sus-
picion portions of testing programs, and courts spend little time up-
holding them.206
Although individualized suspicion is no longer a constitutional pre-
requisite to government drug testing, some lower courts have inter-
preted this part of the Supreme Court's rulings narrowly. These courts
seem to have included a suspicion requirement in the reasonableness
balancing test. In Hartness v. Bush2 7 one court enjoined drug testing of
executive branch employees, reading Skinner and Von Raab to require
at least some substantial generalized suspicion of employee drug use.20 8
The court also concluded that the Supreme Court did not intend to
allow drug testing of all private citizens or even all government employ-
201. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1402; Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1384.
202. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1399-1400 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Before the testing began, the
Customs Service realized that its employees had no significant drug problem. Id. The early test
results bore this out. Of the first 5300 Service employees tested, only 6 were found to have used
drugs recently. Neal, supra note 35, at 63.
203. Constitutional Law Conference, 58 U.S.L.W. 2200, 2205 (Oct. 10, 1989) (synopsis of
Conference assessing the Court's recent decisions and current direction) (remarks of University of
Michigan law professor Yale Kamisar).
204. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1423 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Thurgood Marshall com-
plained that the Court has now replaced the warrant and probable cause requirements with the
special needs analysis in all four of the enumerated areas protected by the fourth amendment:
"persons," Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1402; "houses," Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987); "pa-
pers," O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987); and "effects," New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325
(1985).
205. Constitutional Law Conference, supra note 203, at 2205.
206. See, e.g., Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1409; National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Cheney, 884
F.2d 603 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (challenging only random testing, not uniform or probable cause testing).
Most government testing programs, and all of those following Executive Order No. 12,564, include
testing based on individualized suspicion. See Order, supra note 8, § 3(c)(1).
207. 712 F. Supp. 986 (D.D.C. 1989).
208. Id. at 991. This interpretation is a dubious reading of Von Raab, in which the agency
head admitted that his employees in general had no significant drug problem. See Von Raab, 109
S. Ct. at 1399-1400 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ees.209 Thus, the Hartness decision preserves the individualized suspi-
cion requirement for employees in categories for which the justifications
for testing are less compelling.21 0 The court further specified that in
these cases the testing must be based only on the suspicion that the
employee is under the influence of drugs while on duty.21' Another
court required individualized suspicion for testing postal workers. 212 A
major factor in the balancing test was the weak governmental interest
in testing; the mandatory pre-employment testing was done for research
purposes only.213
B. Uniform Testing
Because the Supreme Court ruled that the standard for suspi-
cionless uniform testing is reasonableness, 4 plaintiffs challenging uni-
form testing must argue that individual factors within the balancing
test make the particular program challenged unreasonable. Uniform
testing is more intrusive than individualized suspicion testing because it
subjects more individuals who do not use drugs to testing. Also, a per-
son may trigger testing with a completely innocent act such as applying
for a job. The Supreme Court ruled, however, that uniform testing is
only a minimal intrusion; therefore, a fairly weak governmental interest
in testing can outweigh the subjects' privacy interests. 215 In several re-
cent cases involving both uniform and random testing, the plaintiffs did
not even challenge uniform testing.21' Other courts specifically allowed
uniform testing,2 17 although some prohibited random testing in the
same case.21 8 After Skinner and Von Raab only a handful of courts
209. Hartness, 712 F. Supp. at 990-91.
210. Although the court required some degree of suspicion for testing most employees, such
as office and maintenance workers, it allowed random, suspicionless testing of employees who carry
firearms. Id. at 993.
211. Id. at 992 (stating that testing must be based on a "reasonable, articulable, and individ-
ualized suspicion" that the employee is under the influence of drugs while on duty). But see Na-
tional Treasury Employees Union v. Watkins, 722 F. Supp. 766 (D.D.C. 1989) (refusing to enjoin
testing of Department of Energy employees suspected of using drugs on- or off-duty).
212. American Postal Workers Union v. Frank, 725 F. Supp. 87 (D. Mass. 1989).
213. Id. at 90.
214. See Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1402; Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1384.
215. See Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1402; Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1384.
216. See, e.g., American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Skinner, 885 F.2d 884 (D.C. Cir. 1989);
Cheney, 884 F.2d at 603; Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484, 486 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert.
denied sub nom. Bell v. Thornburgh, 110 S. Ct. 895 (1990).
217. See, e.g., Brown v. Winkle, 715 F. Supp. 195 (N.D. Ohio 1989) (allowing uniform testing
of firefighters); Draper v. City of Chicago, No. 88-C-10140 (N.D. Ill. May 3, 1989) (WESTLAW,
Genfed library, Dist file) (allowing uniform testing of police officers).
218. See, e.g., Transportation Inst. v. United States Coast Guard, 727 F. Supp. 648 (D.D.C.
1989) (allowing uniform testing of commercial ships' crew members but prohibiting random testing
of the same group). See generally infra notes 226-29 and accompanying text.
1367
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
have required uniform testing to be based on individualized
suspicion.
C. Random Testing
Even more intrusive than the uniform testing approved in Skinner
and Von Raab is random testing, which is certain to be heavily liti-
gated. Random testing invades the employees' privacy more than uni-
form testing because employees cannot predict when testing will occur.
Furthermore, employees may be subject to testing during their entire
careers, not just after a triggering event.220 Random tests usually in-
clude more employees than uniform testing.221 On the other hand, the
randomness eliminates supervisors' discretion over whom to test often
present in uniform programs.222
Although Skinner and Von Raab did not address random testing,
the lower federal courts generally have allowed random testing, relying
on the analytical framework used by the Supreme Court in evaluating
uniform testing.223 The District of Columbia Circuit stated that the ran-
domness of a testing program was merely one factor to be included in
the balancing test; this factor did not require a fundamentally different
analysis from that used in Von Raab.224 Some courts have upheld ran-
dom testing without noting any difference between random and uni-
form testing.225
In some cases, the randomness of a testing program has tipped the
balance to make the testing unreasonable. 2 6 The court in Transporta-
219. See supra Part V(A).
220. Uniform testing is based on such triggering events as application for a job or promotion,
return from leave, and commission of a safety violation. In such programs, the employee can pre-
dict, and perhaps avoid, situations requiring tests. A drug user predicting a test date could abstain
from drug use long enough for the drugs to leave his or her body. Likewise, a drug using employee
could avoid triggering a drug test by not seeking promotions. The Supreme Court has addressed
only uniform government testing programs based on triggering events. See Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at
1402; Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1384.
221. See American Fed'n of Govt Employees, 885 F.2d at 891 n.9. Random testing includes
entire categories of present employees, not just job applicants or employees involved in accidents.
222. Id. at 891.
223. See infra notes 224-25 and accompanying text.
224. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, 885 F.2d at 884; Cheney, 884 F.2d at 608, 609;
Harmon, 878 F.2d at 489.
225. See, e.g., Guiney v. Roache, 873 F.2d 1557 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 404 (1989);
Brown v. City of Detroit, 715 F. Supp. 832 (E.D. Mich. 1989). In fact, the Fourth Circuit confused
uniform and random testing, mistakenly stating that Skinner and Von Raab involved random test-
ing. Following this flawed perception, the court allowed random testing of civilian employees in a
chemical weapons plant. Thomson v. Marsh, 884 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1989).
226. See, e.g., Transportation Inst., 727 F. Supp. at 648. The court allowed uniform and
individualized suspicion testing. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Watkins, 722 F. Supp.




tion Institute v. United States Coast Guard2 7 distinguished uniform
testing, which it allowed, from random testing, which it prohibited." '
The court ruled that crew members of commercial ships had diminished
expectations of privacy, but only in such areas as licensing procedures
and accident investigations. The crew members' privacy interests were
stronger when random testing was involved.2 2
Federal agencies that use random testing usually have uniform
testing as well.130 In cases from these agencies, federal courts have used
essentially the same analytical framework for both random and uniform
testing,' 1 although some of these courts view the randomness of the
tests as weighing in the employees' favor.2' 2 The Supreme Court has
indicated that it will not disturb these decisions, denying certiorari to
three cases that allowed random testing.23
VI. JUDIcIAL TRENDS IN GOVERNMENT DRUG TESTING CASES
A. Reasonableness of Categories of Employees Subject to Testing
The Court's decisions in Skinner and Von Raab established no
clear guidelines as to which employees may be tested for drug use. Em-
ployee categories promise to be the most litigated aspect of governmen-
tal drug testing cases in the near future. The remand order in Von
Raab234 led to a series of lower federal court opinions seeking to define
those job characteristics that create a compelling governmental need to
test employees for drug use.
The justification for testing most frequently offered by the govern-
ment is safety. This factor seems to be readily accepted by the courts,
as long as the threat to the public is fairly immediate.23 ' Courts have
used the safety justification to allow testing of nuclear power plant em-
227. Transportation Inst., 727 F. Supp. at 648.
228. Id. at 655-56.
229. Id. at 654-56.
230. Agency testing also generally includes testing based on reasonable suspicion and unsafe
practices, as authorized by Executive Order No. 12,564 § 3(c). See, e.g., Cheney, 884 F.2d at 605-
06; American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, 885 F.2d at 886 & n.1. Cases involving municipal employ-
ees more often involve only random testing. See, e.g., Guiney, 873 F.2d at 1557; Brown, 715 F.
Supp. at 832.
231. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
232. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
233. Cheney, 884 F.2d at 603; Harmon, 878 F.2d at 484, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 895; Guiney,
873 F.2d at 1557, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 404; Policeman's Benevolent Ass'n of N.J. v. Township of
Washington, 850 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1637 (1989).
234. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1398.
235. Compare Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1402 (finding that impaired railroad workers pose a
severe and immediate threat to public safety) with Harmon, 878 F.2d at 491 (finding that attor-
neys do not pose such a public safety threat).
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ployees,2 3s firefighters, 3 7 hazardous materials inspectors,3 8 aircraft
mechanics,"' pilots,240 air traffic controllers,241 and railroad workers.242
In the transportation field, testing has spread to areas in which the gov-
ernment's safety interest may be legitimate, but does not seem suffi-
cient to justify suspicionless searches of private citizens' bodily
functions. Courts have allowed government testing of school bus at-
tendants,243 airline attendants,244 and government motor vehicle opera-
tors.248 These cases confirm Justice Antonin Scalia's fears that the Von
Raab decision would be used to authorize drug testing of such broad
categories of citizens as automobile drivers, construction workers, and
school crossing guards.248
After Von Raab several courts have upheld drug testing of law en-
forcement personnel, using the law enforcement justification, a hybrid
of the safety justification.247 This justification is stronger when the law
enforcement officers are involved in drug interdiction.28 Just as the
transportation category is expanding, the law enforcement category also
may grow to include all employees of the government or pervasively
236. Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 844 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1988).
237. Brown v. Winkle, 715 F. Supp. 195 (N.D. Ohio 1989). Testing of firefighters is not set-
tled in the courts. See Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 846 F.2d 1539 (6th Cir.) (enjoining testing
of firefighters absent any individualized or generalized suspicion), vacated and reh'g granted, 861
F.2d 1388 (6th Cir. 1988).
238. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, 885 F.2d at 884. These employees supervise the
handling of "poisonous, explosive, and highly flammable commodities," creating a clear risk to the
public. Id. at 891.
239. A single error could have "calamitous consequences." Id. at 892.
240. Cheney, 884 F.2d at 603 (upholding testing of most of the sweeping categories of Army
civilian employees).
241. Id.
242. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1402.
243. Jones v. Jenkins, 878 F.2d 1476 (D.C. Cir. 1989), modifying sub nom. Jones v. McKen-
zie, 833 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
244. Cheney, 884 F.2d at 609-10.
245. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Cavazos, 721 F. Supp. 1361 (D.D.C. 1989) (De-
partment of Education); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, 885 F.2d at 884 (Department of
Transportation). Some Department of Transportation drivers transport foreign dignitaries or large
numbers of bus passengers. Mail van drivers must undergo background investigations and have
some degree of secret security clearance. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, 885 F.2d at 892. For
a discussion of sensitive information, see infra notes 250-52 and accompanying text. See also Von
Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1397 (approving in principle drug tests for employees with access to sensitive
information).
246. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1401 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
247. See, e.g., Guiney v. Roache, 873 F.2d 1557 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 404 (1989)
(upholding testing of police officers who carry firearms or are involved in drug interdiction); Che-
ney, 884 F.2d at 603 (allowing random testing of civilian Army employees involved in law enforce-
ment); Brown v. City of Detroit, 715 F. Supp. 832 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (upholding testing of police
officers).
248. See Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1384; Guiney, 873 F.2d at 1557. It is a bitter irony that the
front-line soldiers in the war on drugs are the first to lose their fourth amendment protections.
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regulated industries who carry firearms. Because of the ad hoc nature of
the balancing test, however, this trend is not clear.249
The most confusion surrounds testing employees who handle sensi-
tive information, in light of the Von Raab Court's sparse guidelines and
the government's myriad levels of secret, classified, and confidential in-
formation. The Supreme Court did explain that lower levels of govern-
ment confidentiality cannot justify drug testing, but the highest levels
will.250 The intermediate levels of sensitive government information re-
quire further exploration. In Harmon v. Thornburgh251 the District of
Columbia Circuit clarified the sensitive information category that
troubled the Von Raab Court. The court allowed the Department of
Justice to test employees with access to top secret material, but stated
that this category did not include all confidential or nonpublic
material.252
Implicit in all government drug testing is the role model rationale:
government employees should stand as symbols of the government's
hopes for a drug free America.53 Symbolism hardly seems like a consti-
tutional justification for a groundless search, but it was significant in
Von Raab, which allowed testing of a work force with a negligible drug
problem.254 Several courts, however, have ruled that the credibility and
integrity of the government work force are not legitimate governmental
interests justifying drug testing.2 55 The danger of the role model ration-
ale is that it replaces the fourth amendment with a test that provides
no real protection or limits. 25 16
249. The Sixth Circuit has granted rehearings en banc for cases that prohibited suspicionless
testing of police officers, Penny v. Kennedy, 846 F.2d 1563 (6th Cir.), vacated and reh'g granted,
862 F.2d 567 (6th Cir. 1988), and firefighters, Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 846 F.2d 1539,
vacated and reh'g granted, 861 F.2d 1388 (6th Cir. 1988). One district court doubted that Penny
was valid law after Von Raab. Brown v. Winkle, 715 F. Supp. 195, 196 (N.D. Ohio 1989).
250. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1384. The Court never fully explained how to distinguish the
different levels of sensitive information.
251. 878 F.2d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 865 (1990).
252. Id. at 491-93. Prosecutors and employees with access to grand jury proceedings cannot
be tested. Id. at 496. The court rejected arguments that testing was justified to maintain the integ-
rity of the work force. Id. at 490.
253. Constitutional Law Conference, supra note 203, at 2206 (remarks of University of
Michigan law professor Yale Kamisar).
254. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1399-1400 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
255. Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989); Harmon, 878 F.2d at 484; Cheney, 884
F.2d at 613. The Cheney court stated: "[Tiaken to its logical end, the integrity rationale would
justify the random testing of every federal employee-a result that would be inconsistent with Von
Raab's essential teachings." Ironically, this aspect of the ruling prohibited the drug testing of some
members of the Army's Drug Testing Laboratories. Cheney, 884 F.2d at 615; see also Dimeo v.
Griffin, 721 F. Supp. 958, 967-69 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (stating that preserving the integrity of the hor-
seracing industry carries little weight in balancing test).
256. Constitutional Law Conference, supra note 203, at 2206. The employee categories to
which the role model rationale could apply are almost limitless. It certainly would include posi-
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The government has ordered testing of private employees in the
railroad,2 57 trucking, 28 and shipping2 5 industries. Courts have held that
the pervasive regulation of these industries diminishes the employees'
expectations of privacy and have allowed testing. The Postal Service
was ruled not pervasively regulated. 260 The limits of this category are
difficult to ascertain.261 Not all employees in these industries are subject
to testing. For example, courts have ruled that regulation of the horse
racing industry diminishes the privacy expectations of jockeys,26 2 but
not other racetrack employees. 2 3
The courts have only begun to clarify the categories of public and
private employees who may be subjected to mandatory drug testing.
Minimum requirements for any testing program include well-defined
categories of employees264 and clearly articulated justifications for test-
ing each category.265
B. Mandatory Drug Testing As Self-Incrimination
Arguably, drug testing invokes the self-incrimination clause, yet no
drug testing case has presented a ripe fifth amendment fact situation.266
The testing guidelines in Skinner expressly ordered the release of test
tions of trust or real or perceived authority. Government mandated drug testing would expand
exponentially if the role model rationale were applied to pervasively regulated industries such as
the law, banking, securities, broadcasting, real estate, and day care centers.
257. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1418-19 (1989).
258. Owner-Operators Indep. Drivers Assoc. of Am., Inc. v. Burnley, 705 F. Supp. 481, 487-88
(N.D. Cal. 1989) (allowing reasonable suspicion testing and some forms of uniform testing, but
enjoining random and postaccident testing).
259. Transportation Inst. v. United States Coast Guard, 727 F. Supp. 648 (D.D.C. 1989).
260. American Postal Workers Union v. Frank, 725 F. Supp. 87, 90 (D. Mass. 1989).
261. An analogy may be made to cases in which the Supreme Court has ruled that the perva-
sive regulation of motor vehicles diminished the owners' expectations of privacy. See California v.
Carney, 47i U.S. 386 (1985) (mobile motor home); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368
(1976) (car). Although these cases related to searches of the vehicles rather than of the person,
these holdings might be used in the reasonableness balancing test to broaden permissible searches
in the pervasive regulation category.
262. Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1142 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1986).
263. Griffin, 721 F. Supp. at 970-71.
264. See, e.g., Taylor, 888 F.2d at 1189 (finding that the county may not test all corrections
officers); Cheney, 884 F.2d at 614-15 (remanding to determine the reasonableness of testing a
broad employee category that included nuclear reactor operators, chemical ammunition mainte-
nance specialists, secretaries, research biologists, and animal handlers); Harmon, 878 F.2d at 490
(stating that the Von Raab court did not intend for all federal employees to be tested); Transpor-
tation Inst., 727 F. Supp. at 648 (stating that all crew members on commercial ships is too broad a
category to submit to random testing); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Thornburgh, 720 F.
Supp. 154 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (finding that the federal Bureau of Prisons may not subject all employ-
ees to testing).
265. See Cheney, 884 F.2d at 611.
266. The fifth amendment reads in part, "nor shall [any person] be compelled in any crimi-
nal case to be a witness against himself .... " U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
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results to a party in litigation.267 This rule might create a situation in
which employees would invoke the fifth amendment, as the release of
information obtained from their bodies would lead to incrimination.
The Skinner Court, however, did not consider the fifth amendment is-
sue because the testing did not appear to be a pretext to gather evi-
dence for a criminal investigation. 68
The HHS Guidelines provide that test results may not be released
to law enforcement authorities without the employee's permission.6 9
The Guidelines, though, are based on Executive Order No. 12,564,
which does not specifically shield test results from law enforcement au-
thorities. 70 In light of the public's and the government's attitudes to-
ward the war on drugs, drug enforcement agencies are likely to begin to
subpoena governmental drug testing results.
When a ripe fifth amendment claim arises, courts may cite prece-
dent holding that an administrative search does not become unconstitu-
tional solely because the search uncovers evidence later used in a
criminal trial. 71 Courts also may rely on Schmerber v. California,272
which held that a blood test of an unwilling drunken driving suspect
did not constitute compelled testimony. Following the Supreme Court's
lead in sacrificing certain liberties in the war on drugs, lower courts may
find no fifth amendment violations in the release of employee drug test
results.
C. Drug Addiction As a Handicap
Employees have argued, with mixed results, that drug addiction is
a handicap protected from discrimination by the Rehabilitation Act of
267. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1415 n.5 (quoting 49 C.F.R. § 219.211(d) (1987)).
268. Id. at 1415 n.5. Many courts have justified relaxing fourth amendment protections on
the ground that government drug testing is not related to criminal investigations. See, e.g., id.;
American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Skinner, 885 F.2d 884, 889 (D.C. Cir. 1989); National Fed'n
of Gov't Employees v. Cheney, 884 F.2d 603, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1989). One could argue, though, that
the government's interest in promoting an actual criminal prosecution is stronger than its interest
in an administrative search. Using this logic, courts might allow the use of the results of employee
drug tests in criminal prosecutions, thus creating ripe fifth amendment issues. See Stewart, supra
note 114, at 50.
269. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, 885 F.2d at 889 (citing Guidelines, supra note 26,
at Subpart B, § 2.8).
270. The Order provides that agencies are "not required" to report violations of federal drug
laws to the Attorney General. Order, supra note 8, § 5(h).
271. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (holding that evidence discovered in an admin-
istrative search of an unregistered junkyard may be used in subsequent criminal trial). Professor
Kamisar made an analogy to administrative searches of airline passengers, which were designed to
detect weapons but often detect illegal drugs. Constitutional Law Conference, supra note 203, at
2205.
272. 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966).
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1973.273 The Act covers people who are impaired or regarded as being
impaired,7 4 but are otherwise qualified for employment. 5 This defini-
tion includes substance abusers.2 7 6 The Supreme Court has held that
the Act requires individual inquiries into each handicapped employee's
fitness. 1 7 On the other hand, the Court has allowed the Veterans' Ad-
ministration to classify alcoholism as willful misconduct and thereby
deny certain benefits to alcoholics.2 78
Lower federal courts generally have had little difficulty deciding
that the Rehabilitation Act does not prevent drug testing and subse-
quent sanctions against employeesY.79 Although the Act has had little
effect on testing programs themselves, the Act may protect individuals
in certain situations. In Nisperos v. Buck 28 0 an attorney for the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service (INS) admitted his drug problem to
his superior and sought treatment, but was later arrested on drug
charges and fired from his job. 81 The court ruled that the INS violated
the Rehabilitation Act by firing the attorney.82 Similarly, an employee
who tests positive and undergoes treatment arguably may not be fired
without violating the Act.
D. Reasonableness of the Testing Procedures
In early drug testing cases, employees attacked both the reasona-
bleness of the collection procedures in urine testing and the accuracy of
all types of drug tests. As testing procedures have become more uni-
form, especially under the HHS Guidelines, employees have not raised
these issues. Most courts have held that the degree of privacy given
employees in urine tests under the HHS Guidelines is satisfactory.28 3
273. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-795(i) (1988).
274. Zimmerman, Urine Testing, Testing-Based Employment Decisions and the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973, 22 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBs. 219, 220, 247 (1989).
275. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
276. Zimmerman, supra note 274, at 248. Congress considered excluding all substance abus-
ers from the Act, but instead excluded only substance abusers who are unable to work or who
threaten others' safety or property. Id. at 248-49.
277. School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 281 (1987) (stating that the court must determine
whether a school teacher is qualified for her job despite being afflicted with tuberculosis).
278. Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535 (1988).
279. See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Skinner, 885 F.2d at 897 (stating that al-
though the testing program does not violate the Rehabilitation Act, a case may arise in which the
Act does protect a person from testing).
280. 720 F. Supp. 1424 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
281. Id. at 1425-26.
282. Id. at 1428-32; cf. Doe v. Roe, Inc., 143 Misc. 2d 156, 539 N.Y.S. 2d 876 (Sup. Ct. 1989)
(finding that a drug abuser who was denied a job is covered by New York laws protecting the
handicapped).
283. The Guidelines allow the employee to urinate in a stall, under aural but not visual su-
pervision. Visual supervision occurs only when alteration of a specimen is suspected. Guidelines,
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Early disputes over the accuracy of the drug tests also have been
settled.284
Courts also have agreed that the tests are reasonable even though
they detect only recent drug use, not on-the-job impairment. 285 Nor are
courts concerned that most government drug tests do not detect abuse
of alcohol or prescription drugs.288 This factor is a serious flaw in the
government's argument that testing is done to improve safety and pro-
ductivity, not for law enforcement purposes. Alcohol abuse severely af-
fects safety and productivity, and alcohol testing can be done at the
same time as drug testing.28
7
VII. CONCLUSION
It is alarming how easily the impracticality of obtaining a warrant
becomes a special need allowing a suspicionless search.2 88 Perhaps war-
rants are impractical for administrative searches, including drug tests,
because the fourth amendment was written to prohibit such dragnet
searches. The entire fourth amendment consists of limits on law en-
forcement agents. Such limits have the inevitable result of allowing
some guilty parties to go free in order to preserve the liberties of the
innocent. Unwilling to allow such a tradeoff in drug enforcement cases,
the Court replaced the concrete fourth amendment protections of war-
rant and probable cause with the shamelessly malleable balancing test.
With the nationwide drug hysteria weighing on the government's side of
the balance, even a group as innocent as the Customs employees in Von
supra note 26, at Subpart B, § 2.2(f)(16).
Routinely requiring testers to watch the employees urinate invokes extreme privacy interests
that are more difficult to overcome. See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Thornburgh, 720 F.
Supp. 154, 155 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (striking down a testing program because, among other factors,
it required the visual observation of all employees' urination). Contra Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1428
n.8 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority ignored the FRA Field Manual's recommen-
dation that officials visually supervise employees' urination).
284. One court reversed its earlier ruling that the commonly used test was too inaccurate to
be constitutionally reasonable. Jones v. Jenkins, 878 F.2d 1476 (D.C. Cir. 1989), modifying sub
nom. Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
285. See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1420-21 (1989);
American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, 885 F.2d at 896; National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Che-
ney, 884 F.2d 603, 610-11 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 864 (1990); see also supra note
147. But see Dimeo v Griffin, 721 F. Supp. 958, 969 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (finding that testing the em-
ployees of a horse racing track does little to promote safety, because testing does not measure
employees' present impairment).
286. See, e.g., American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, 885 F.2d at 895.
287. See M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 4, at 102-03.
288. Indeed, the very notion that impractical constitutional protections can be disregarded




Raab cannot escape drug testing.28 9
Courts often justify suspicionless drug tests on the grounds that
the tests are necessary to address special needs beyond normal law en-
forcement procedures.290 From an employee's point of view, this ration-
ale is transparent. No law enforcement action is more normal than
deterring, detecting, and punishing people who break the law. As courts
have eroded the fourth amendment in recent years, the legislative and
executive branches have erected an extraconstitutional law enforcement
system for drug crimes. This system uses the power of law to compel
employees to undergo suspicionless searches. A laboratory technician
declares the employee guilty. The employer is then required to disci-
pline the employee, including dismissal, a substantial deprivation of
property. Finally, the agency may give the test results to traditional law
enforcement agencies, which may result in the deprivation of the em-
ployee's liberty or of more property through criminal penalties.29' Such
actions would be declared unconstitutional if performed completely by
police. 92
The ad hoc nature of the balancing test gives courts, police, and
citizens no clear indication of how far the government can go in de-
manding drug tests. Courts have veered so far from the traditional
fourth amendment model that it would be quixotic to suggest that drug
testing should require a warrant and probable cause. An individualized
suspicion requirement seems unlikely, given the Supreme Court's ac-
ceptance of uniform testing.293 The outer limit to drug testing appears
to be some type of random testing. The disturbing result is that mun-
dane, nondrug searches must be based on a warrant and probable cause,
but highly intrusive searches of excretion are based on randomness, the
total absence of suspicion.
James M. Sokolowski*
289. Still, the presence or absence of a suspicion of drug use by an individual or group should
weigh heavily in the balancing test. See supra Part V(A).
290. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1414 (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)).
291. See supra Part VI(B).
292. This scenario would resemble a scene from the movie Brazil: Police would storm a fire
station or railroad yard unannounced, demanding urine samples from all employees. Anyone who
refuses to cooperate or fails the test would be disciplined. At no point does an impartial magistrate
approve the police action. Cf. Benner, Diminishing Expectations of Privacy in the Rehnquist
Court, 22 J. MARSHALL-L. REV. 825, 850 & n.132 (1989) (stating that under Skinner it may be
constitutional for police to set up a roadblock and demand urine specimens from all drivers).
293. See supra notes 201-05 and accompanying text.
* The Author wishes to thank his wife, Rachel W. Sokolowski, without whose support this
Note would not have been possible.
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